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SCHOOLS—DISTRICT LIABILITY: 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION LIABILITY AND SCHOOL DUTIES 
PREVAIL OVER RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY 
M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1, 
2010 ND 102, 783 N.W.2d 806 
ABSTRACT 
 
In M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statutes 
were not applicable when a student was injured on school grounds during 
school hours.  Thus, a school district, as a political subdivision, can be lia-
ble for a student’s injuries pursuant to section 32-12.1-03 of the North 
Dakota Century Code.  Recreational use immunity statutes, or some varia-
tion of the statutes, can be found in all states and are in place to encourage 
landowners to open their property for recreational purposes without facing 
the risks of liability.  While landowners do not have a duty to warn or keep 
the premises safe for recreational users, a willful or malicious failure to 
guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity may 
still result in liability.  Since North Dakota’s enactment of the recreational 
use immunity statutes in 1965, the statutes have endured several modifica-
tions and judicial interpretations, including their applicability to political 
subdivisions.  However, through consideration of the purpose of the recrea-
tional use immunity statutes, the location of the accident, other laws per-
taining to the special relationship between schools and students, and the 
analysis provided by other courts, the North Dakota Supreme Court de-
clined to immunize the school district under these statutes when M.M., a 
student, injured himself while performing a bike stunt in the school 
auditorium shortly after classes adjourned.  By narrowing the use of the 
recreational use immunity statutes, more liability may result from the M.M. 
decision as contrary to the legislature’s policy decision behind enacting the 
statutes. 
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I. FACTS 
In 2004, M.M. was a ninth grade student attending Discovery Middle 
School in Fargo, North Dakota.1  As a part of the curriculum taught by U.S. 
History teacher Eugenia Hart, students could participate in the annual event 
called “60s Day,” which consisted of various activities.2  One year, a 
student performed a bike stunt for the event in the school’s auditorium.3  
M.M.’s classmate, J.B., learned of the student’s stunt and approached M.M. 
about recreating the stunt for the 2004 “60s Day.”4  When J.B. asked Hart 
about the stunt, J.B. allegedly did not receive an affirmative “yes” or “no” 
answer until Hart later approached M.M. and told M.M. it was “not a good 
idea.”5 
The day before the event, J.B. and M.M. decided to practice the stunt in 
the school’s auditorium.6  Without formal permission to do so, and despite 
Hart’s conversation with M.M., M.M. and J.B. brought their bikes into the 
auditorium in order to practice; the two entered through a side door left ajar, 
between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.7  At the school, classes adjourned at 3:30 
p.m., but teachers and administrators typically stayed until 4:00 p.m.8  On 
this particular day, Hart left the school at approximately 3:30 p.m.9 
When practicing, J.B. successfully completed his stunt.10  When M.M. 
attempted the stunt, however, he fell and hit his head on the auditorium 
floor.11  As a result of the fall, M.M. sustained serious injuries.12 
M.M. and his father, Thomas Moore, brought suit against Hart and 
Fargo Public School District No. 1 (the District) in 2007 for Hart’s negli-
gent actions during the course of her employment.13  The District moved for 
summary judgment before trial, which was granted on the ground that the 
recreational use immunity statutes from chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota 
Century Code shielded the school from liability for accidents occurring on 
 
1. M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶ 2, 783 N.W.2d 806, 808. 
2. Id. at 809. 
3. Id. ¶ 3. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
6. Id. ¶ 4. 
7. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. 
8. Id. ¶ 4. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. ¶ 5. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. ¶ 6.  A separate claim was brought against Hart for personal liability. Id. 
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school property.14  The trial court also found the “willful and malicious” 
exception to the recreational use immunity statute did not apply based on 
the evidence presented.15  M.M. and Thomas Moore appealed the decision, 
arguing the district court erred in ruling recreational use immunity shielded 
the District from liability.16 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
All fifty states have some form of recreational use immunity statutes in 
place to protect landowners from injuries stemming from recreational use of 
their land when it is open for such use.17  Many of these statutes are similar 
to model legislation promulgated by the Council of State Governments 
called “Public recreation on private lands: limitations on liability.”18  North 
Dakota followed the example legislation and passed chapter 53-08 of the 




16. Id. ¶ 7, 783 N.W.2d at 810. 
17. Id. ¶ 14, 783 N.W.2d at 812; see MATTHEW BENDER, PREMISES LIABILITY—LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 5.01 (2010); see also ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-1 to -28 (2009); ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.65.200 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to -
307 (2009); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (Deering 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to -106 
(2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-557f to -557i (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-5907 
(2010); FLA. STAT. § 375.251 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (2009);  HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 520-1 to -8 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1604 (2009); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 65/1-
65/7 (2008); IND. CODE § 14-22-10-2 (2003); IOWA CODE §§ 461C.1-461C.7 (2010); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.190 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:2795 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 159-A (2009); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. 
§§ 5-1101 to -1108 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 17C (2009); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS SERV. § 324.73301 (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 604A.20-.27 (2010); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -27 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 537.345-537.347 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 70-16-301 to -302 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-729 to -736 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41.510 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2A:42A-2 to -5.1 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (2006); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-
103 (Consol. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to -4 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 
(2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18 to -181 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, 
§ 10.1 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.682 (2009); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 477-1 to -7 
(West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -6 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to -70 (2007); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-12 to -18 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-10-101 to -104 (1999); 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001-75.003 (West 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-
1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5791-5795 (2002); VA. CODE  ANN. § 29-
130.2 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.200-.210 (LexisNexis 2008); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to 
-6 (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-19-101 to 
-107 (2009).  
18. Cf. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner’s Liability for 
Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R.4th 262, 270 (2010). 
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in 1965.19  However, since 1965, the statutes have undergone several legis-
lative modifications in response to judicial rulings.20 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY STATUTES 
The express purpose of many recreational use immunity statutes is “to 
encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the 
public for recreational purposes.”21  The statutes arose due to judicial ex-
pansion of those who constitute an “invitee”22 on land for purposes of 
owing a duty of care, thereby immunizing landowners against claims con-
cerning maintenance and operation of property offered for free, recreational 
purposes.23  While recreational use immunity statutes may differ from state-
to-state, many of these statutes follow partially or entirely the suggested 
legislation offered by the Council of State Governments.24 
Overall, the suggested legislation provides that a landowner whose land 
is being used for recreational purposes, without charge, owes no duty either 
to provide care to keep the property safe for entry or use or to give any 
warning of “a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity” on the prop-
erty.25  Additionally, the legislation states a landowner neither extends any 
assurances the property is safe for a recreational user nor confers on a recre-
ational user the legal status of an invitee26 or licensee,27 which would 
impose a duty of care on a landowner.28  Yet, any “willful or malicious fail-
ure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activ-
ity” may result in a landowner’s liability.29  Therefore, the main question 
 
19. See 1965 N.D. Laws 648-50.  Today, the chapter is known as “Liability Limited for 
Owner of Recreation Lands.”  N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08. 
20. Compare, e.g., Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶ 13, 563 N.W.2d 384, 388 
(noting that recreational use immunity statutes, as enacted in 1965, were applicable only to private 
landowners), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(2) (“‘Land’ includes all public and private 
lands . . . .”). 
21. BENDER, supra note 17, § 5.01; see also 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150 (The 
Council of State Governments, 1965). 
22. An “invitee,” particularly a “public invitee,” is defined as “a person who is invited to 
enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to 
the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). 
23. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.05.42 (3d ed. 
2003). 
24. Miller, supra note 18, at 270. 
25. Id. at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 151; see, e.g., N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-02 to -03. 
26. See supra note 22. 
27. A “licensee” is defined as “a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by 
virtue of the possessor’s consent.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 22, § 330. 
28. Miller, supra note 18, at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 
151; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-03 to -04. 
29. Miller, supra note 18, at 271; 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 21, at 
151; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05. 
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that arises in many suits pertaining to recreational use and personal injuries 
is whether the statutes are applicable and, if they are not, which common 
law principles will determine the landowner’s liability.30 
B. STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY 
STATUTES IN NORTH DAKOTA 
With the enactment of the recreational use immunity statutes in chapter 
53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code, the North Dakota Legislature 
mirrored the purpose stated by the Council of State Governments and 
explicitly wanted “to encourage landowners to open their land to the public 
for recreational purposes” by limiting landowners’ liability toward users.31  
However, faced with judicial decisions expanding potential liability and 
limiting the application of these statutes after their enactment,32 the 
legislature was forced to change the language of some sections in chapter 
53-08 to broaden the statutes’ applicability.33 
1. Enactment and Original Purpose in 1965 
Following the lead of many states and the Council of State 
Governments’ suggested legislation, North Dakota introduced and passed 
the recreational use immunity statutes in 1965.34  These statutes provided so 
long as the owner of land did not perform willful or malicious acts against 
recreational users and did not charge the person injured for recreational use 
of the land, he or she owed no duty of care to keep the premises safe for 
recreational purposes, or to give any warning to those individuals on the 
premises of potentially dangerous conditions.35  Also, by using the land for 
recreational purposes, the user did not have any assurances the land is safe, 
that he or she has the legal status of an invitee or licensee, or that the owner 
assumed any responsibility for injuries.36  Initially, the term “recreational 
purpose” was defined by including examples of recreational activities.37  
“Land” also included an exhaustive list of “roads, water, watercourses, 
 
30. Miller, supra note 18, at 271. 
31. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶ 10, 563 N.W.2d 384, 387. 
32. See id.; see also Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D. 
1987) (citing Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D. 1974)). 
33. See Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 508-09. 
34. Cf. 1965 N.D. Laws 648-50. 
35. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-02, -05 (2007). 
36. Id. §§ 53-08-03 to -04. 
37. See Stokka v. Cass Cnty. Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 913 (N.D. 1985) (“‘Recreational 
purposes’ includes, but is not limited to, any one or any combination of the following:  hunting, 
fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water 
skiing, winter sports, and visiting, viewing, or enjoying historical, archaeological, geological, 
scenic, or scientific sites, or otherwise using land for purposes of the user.”). 
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private ways and buildings, structures and machinery or equipment thereon 
when attached to the realty.”38 
The statutes remained unchallenged until the 1985 case of Stokka v. 
Cass County Electric Cooperative.39  While the main argument in the case 
was whether Stokka’s snowmobiling accident occurred in a location within 
the definition of “land,” as defined in section 53-08-01 of the North Dakota 
Century Code, Stokka made a public policy argument toward expanding 
tort liability in order to disallow the statutes’ applicability in his case.40  The 
court rejected the argument as beyond the duty of the judiciary and more 
appropriate for the North Dakota Legislature.41  Rather, the court noted its 
task was to interpret the current recreational use statutes, which led the 
court to conclude the public highways Stokka used when his snowmobiling 
accident occurred fell within the bounds of the statutes.42  As a result, the 
statutes shielded the landowner from liability unless the landowner’s 
actions were willful or malicious.43 
2. Application in Response to Governmental Liability 
After the abolishment of governmental immunity for political sub-
divisions, the North Dakota Legislature passed chapter 32-12.1, relating to 
political subdivision liability.44  The recreational use immunity statutes 
were questioned in relation to a new subsection in chapter 32-12.1, sub-
section 32-12.1-03(1), in Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource 
District.45  In that case, Fastow dove into a designated swimming area 
regulated by the Water District and injured his spinal cord.46  Because the 




40. Id. at 914. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 915. 
43. Id. 
44. Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 508 (N.D. 1987) (citing 
Kitto v. Minot Park Dist., 224 N.W.2d 795, 797 (N.D. 1974)).  In particular, subsection 32-12.1-
03(1) provides: 
Each political subdivision shall be liable for money damages for injuries when the 
injuries are proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment or office under cir-
cumstances where the employee would be personally liable to a claimant in accor-
dance with the laws of this state, or injury caused from some condition or use of tan-
gible property, real or personal, under circumstances where the political subdivision, if 
a private person, would be liable to the claimant. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (2010). 
45. 415 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1987). 
46. Fastow, 415 N.W.2d at 507. 
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in were recreational, an issue on appeal was whether the more recently 
passed chapter 32-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code required the 
application of the recreational use immunity statutes to political 
subdivisions.47 
The trial court determined subsection 32-12.1-03(1) provided two 
instances for a political subdivision to be held liable for injuries, and the 
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed.48  One instance of political subdi-
vision liability arises when the injury occurred due to a condition or use of 
the property and a private person could be liable under the same circum-
stances.49  Another instance of liability may arise for “injuries caused by the 
negligence or wrongful act or omission of an employee acting within the 
scope of the employee’s employment [for the political subdivision].”50  
Although political subdivision liability exists under these circumstances, the 
court stated when injuries are sustained by a nonpaying recreational user 
such as Fastow, chapter 53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code precludes 
liability for acts of ordinary negligence or property conditions.51 
The issue addressed in Fastow was revisited in Hovland v. City of 
Grand Forks.52  There, Hovland was injured while in-line skating on a 
municipal bike path and sued the City of Grand Forks (City) for 
negligence.53  The lower court granted the City’s motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the recreational use immunity statute applied to 
political subdivisions.54  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding the discussion announced in Fastow—regarding political 
subdivision liability in relation to recreational use—to be dicta because the 
essential holding of Fastow was that the political subdivision waived its 
immunity by purchasing insurance coverage.55  Therefore, because the 
application of the recreational use immunity statutes to political 
subdivisions would circumvent the legislative intent behind political 
subdivision liability in chapter 32-12.1, and because the recreational use 
immunity statutes were created to encourage private landowners to open 
lands for public access, the court determined the City was not immune.56 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 509. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id.  When a political subdivision has insurance coverage, however, chapter 53-08 does 
not apply for immunity. Id. 
52. 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384. 
53. Hovland, ¶¶ 2-3, 563 N.W.2d at 385-86. 
54. Id. ¶ 4, 563 N.W.2d at 386. 
55. Id. ¶ 8, 563 N.W.2d at 386-87. 
56. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 563 N.W.2d at 387-88 (emphasis added). 
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3. Legislative Amendments to Recreational Use 
Immunity Statutes 
The North Dakota Legislature recognized the need to alter the recrea-
tional use immunity statutes to withstand further judicial scrutiny.57  Thus, 
the legislature first amended the statutes by changing the language “willful 
or malicious” in subsection 53-08-05(1) to “willful and malicious.”58  In 
1995, the statutes were again amended to change the definitions of “land” 
and “recreational purposes.”59  The new definitions provided “land” 
included “all public and private land . . .” and “recreational purpose” was 
“any activity engaged in for the purpose of exercise, relaxation, pleasure, or 
education.”60  The legislative intent behind changing these definitions was 
to protect landowners, regardless of whether the land was public or private, 
as well as to expand the types of activities that were recreational to protect 
against the exposure of liability.61 
C. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY 
The North Dakota cases dealing with recreational use immunity can be 
categorized into two separate time frames according to the legislative 
changes explained above:  pre- and post-1995 amendments to chapter 53-
08.  Although political subdivision liability had been discussed in North 
Dakota cases, the issue of a school’s liability had not been addressed, with 
the exception of one concurring opinion in Olson v. Bismarck Parks and 
Recreation District.62 
1. North Dakota’s Interpretation of Recreational Use Immunity 
Prior to the 1995 Amendments 
The first recreational use immunity case before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court was Stokka.63  However, the first case to question political 
subdivision liability in relation to recreational use immunity was Fastow.64  
 
57. See Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the House Agric. Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 
1995) [hereinafter House Hearing] (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land Comm’r, 
dated Feb. 22, 1995). 
58. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 8, 642 N.W.2d 864, 867 
(citing 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 503, § 1) (emphasis added). 
59. Id. (citing 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 162, § 7). 
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01 (2007) (emphasis added). 
61. See Olson, ¶ 8, 642 N.W.2d at 867; see also Hearing on S.B. 2127 Before the Senate 
Agric. Comm., 54th Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 1995) (testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land 
Comm’r). 
62. See Olson, ¶ 22, 642 N.W.2d at 872 (Neumann, J., concurring). 
63. See supra Part II.B.1. 
64. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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Despite the Fastow court’s discussion that chapter 53-08 relating to 
immunity precludes subsection 32-12.1-03(1) liability for ordinary negli-
gence of a political subdivision,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court held, in 
Hovland, the original recreational use immunity statutes only insulated 
private landowners from liability in light of the abolition of governmental 
immunity.66  The change in the court’s interpretation sparked the legisla-
ture’s willingness to broaden the recreational use immunity statutes and 
allowed, once again, for some form of political subdivision immunity with 
the inclusion of “public lands” in the recreational use statutes.67 
2. North Dakota’s Interpretation Following the 
1995 Amendments 
In their current form, the broadened recreational use immunity statutes 
are constitutionally applicable to political subdivisions.68  This pronounce-
ment occurred in Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation District.69  In 
Olson, two sledders injured themselves on property owned by the Parks and 
Recreation District, which was a political subdivision.70  After determining 
the legislature had altered the recreational use immunity statutes to include 
public landowners, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the statutes 
applied to preclude any suit for ordinary negligence against the political 
subdivision.71  Because the activity of sledding was clearly recreational, the 
statutes’ purpose was fulfilled by limiting tort liability for opening land 
without charge for recreational use.72 
Even with considerable legislative changes to recreational use immu-
nity statutes, more cases questioned the extent of the new definitions.  For 
instance, in Leet v. City of Minot,73 Leet was injured while working at a 
municipal auditorium for a vendor that was participating in an educational 
and entertainment event.74  Although the legislature’s intent in changing the 
definition of “recreational purposes” was to cover all recreational 
 
65. See Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D. 1987). 
66. Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶¶ 10-11, 563 N.W.2d 384, 387. 
67. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land 
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995); see also Hovland, ¶ 16 n.5, 563 N.W.2d at 388 (“Since Fastow, 
the legislature has amended the recreational use statute to include all public lands, as well as 
private land.”). 
68. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 17, 642 N.W.2d 864, 871. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. ¶ 2, 642 N.W.2d at 865. 
71. Id. ¶ 17, 642 N.W.2d at 871. 
72. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 642 N.W.2d at 870-71. 
73. 2006 ND 191, 721 N.W.2d 398. 
74. Leet, ¶ 2, 721 N.W.2d at 401. 
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activities,75 the court noted consideration must be given to the location and 
nature of the person’s conduct when the person was injured.76  Thus, 
“recreational purposes” could not logically include all activities, and Leet’s 
purpose at the site for employment could not be considered “recreational.”77 
The factors from Leet were also considered in Kappenman v. Klipfel78 
as the primary analysis in determining whether to apply the recreational use 
immunity statutes.  In Kappenman, a thirteen-year-old boy was killed while 
driving an all-terrain vehicle when it dropped into a washout on land owned 
by Klipfel.79  The North Dakota Supreme Court noted the term “roads” was 
included within the definition of “land” for purposes of recreational use 
immunity, but the court stated the legislature could not have intended all 
roads open for both travel and recreation to be included within the defini-
tion.80  Because North Dakota cases prior to Kappenman held a location 
must be open for a recreational purpose in order to apply chapter 53-08, and 
because the section line was held out for purposes of non-recreation and 
recreation, the recreational use immunity statutes did not apply.81 
The latest case to address recreational purpose under chapter 53-08 was 
Schmidt v. Gateway Community Fellowship.82  In that case, Schmidt, a 
pedestrian, stepped into a hole at a mall parking lot while attending an event 
sponsored by Gateway Community Fellowship, a local church.83  The pur-
pose of the event was recreational, but there was also a commercial aspect 
by soliciting vendors and charging a registration fee for contests.84  As a 
result of the “mixed use” of recreational and commercial use, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court announced that a balancing test of all the social and 
economic aspects of the activity and a totality of the circumstances standard 
was necessary to determine whether chapter 53-08 applied.85  In order to 
properly consider all the factors surrounding the activity, including, but not 
limited to, the user’s subjective purpose, the issue of whether recreational 
use immunity applied was remanded to the trier of fact to decide.86 
 
75. Id. ¶ 17, 721 N.W.2d at 405 (quoting House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of 
Robert Olheiser, State Land Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995)). 
76. Id. ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d at 406. 
77. See id. ¶ 21. 
78. 2009 ND 89, 765 N.W.2d 716. 
79. Kappenman, ¶¶ 2, 4, 765 N.W.2d at 718-19. 
80. Id. ¶ 23, 765 N.W.2d at 725. 
81. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 765 N.W.2d at 727 (emphasis added). 
82. 2010 ND 69, 781 N.W.2d 200. 
83. Schmidt, ¶ 2, 781 N.W.2d at 202. 
84. Id. ¶ 3. 
85. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22-23, 781 N.W.2d at 207-08. 
86. Id. ¶ 24, 781 N.W.2d at 209.  The balancing test adopted by the court was not clearly 
stated in Schmidt, but it alluded to consideration of many factors such as “the nature of the 
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3. Foreshadowing of School Applicability 
Justice Neumann’s concurring opinion in Olson indicated his dismay 
about the wording of other definitions in the recreational use immunity stat-
utes in the context of student injuries occurring on school grounds.87  Spe-
cifically, he stated his concern was the word “education” included in the 
definition of “recreational purposes.”88  According to Justice Neumann, 
“The statute appears to relieve all school districts of any duty to keep their 
buildings and other premises safe for use by students who have not paid a 
fee for the educational use of those premises.”89  As explained below, 
Justice Neumann’s concern was addressed, and arguably definitively 
answered, in M.M. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In order to reach its result in M.M., regarding which standard of 
negligence for which the District was bound, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court separated its analysis into three different parts.  First, the court 
examined the applicable North Dakota law governing liability for injuries.90  
Second, the court stated the current analysis for recreational use immunity 
and addressed whether the recreational use immunity statutes were appli-
cable considering the duties of schools toward students.91  Third, the court 
compared the case to other jurisdictions that reached similar outcomes.92 
A. CONTROLLING NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
Under the North Dakota Century Code, political subdivisions may be 
liable under recreational use immunity statutes if certain circumstances 
exist.93  However, the North Dakota Century Code also provides an excep-
tion to liability with the recreational use immunity statutes.94  In an attempt 
to “harmonize statutes to avoid conflicts between them,” the court analyzed 
each statute to determine whether recreational use immunity applied and, 
 
property, the nature of the owner’s activity, and the reason the injured person is on the property.” 
Id. ¶ 22, 781 N.W.2d at 208 (citations omitted).  Additional focus may be whether there was 
emphasis on free recreational use or whether there were more commercial aspects to the activity. 
Id. ¶ 21. 
87. Olson v. Bismarck Parks & Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 22, 642 N.W.2d 864, 872. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, ¶¶ 9-10, 783 N.W.2d 806, 810-11. 
91. Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 783 N.W.2d at 812-13. 
92. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15. 
93. Id. ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1) (2010)). 
94. Id. ¶ 10, 783 N.W.2d at 811. 
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ultimately, what standard of negligence applied to the District for injuries 
that occurred on the District’s property.95 
1. Political Subdivision Liability—General Negligence Standard 
As the court in M.M. noted, North Dakota follows a general negligence 
standard for premises liability.96  That is, a landowner’s duty of care to 
those on his property is to “exercise reasonable care to maintain the prop-
erty in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, includ-
ing the likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of injury, and the 
burden of avoiding the risk.”97  While this principle applies to all lawful 
entrants on the property, it does not extend to trespassers.98  Instead, a land-
owner must only not harm a trespasser in a willful manner.99 
This standard applies to political subdivisions when certain circum-
stances exist, as codified in section 32-12.1-03(1) of the North Dakota 
Century Code.100  By virtue of the definition provided for “political subdi-
vision,” this statute extends to school districts.101  Not only can a political 
subdivision be liable for injuries caused by a condition or use of property to 
the same extent that a private person could be liable for the injury, but a 
political subdivision can also be held liable for injuries “caused by the neg-
ligence or wrongful act or omission of an employee acting within the scope 
of the employee’s employment.”102  Thus, the court concluded a school 
district could potentially face liability on two separate and independent 
grounds.103 
2. Recreational Use Immunity Statutes—Willful and Malicious 
Conduct Standard 
An exception to political subdivision liability is the recreational use 
immunity statutes, if the statutes apply.104  Under these statutes, the land-
owner’s duty of care may change from the general negligence standard to 
 
95. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting In re Midgett, 2007 ND 198, ¶ 12, 742 N.W.2d 803, 806). 
96. Id. ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810. 
97. Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d 200, 203. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810. 
101. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-02(6)(a) (2010) (defining “political subdivision” to include 
“all . . . school districts . . . which are created either by statute or by the Constitution of North 
Dakota for local government or other public purposes”). 
102. M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810-11 (quoting Fastow v. Burleigh Cnty. Water Res. Dist., 
415 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D. 1982)); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03(1). 
103. See M.M., ¶ 9, 783 N.W.2d at 810. 
104. Id. ¶ 10, 783 N.W.2d at 811. 
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no duty of care if the landowner opens his property for recreational pur-
poses.105  Once the land is open for recreational purposes without charge, 
the owner owes no duty to keep the premises safe or to warn against any 
danger present, absent any willful and malicious failure to do so.106 
In M.M., the lower court determined the District’s property fell within 
the definition of “land” and that the activity in which M.M. participated was 
educational within the definition of “recreational purpose.”107  In deciding 
that the District and activity semantically fit within the recreational use 
immunity statutes, the standard applied was whether the District, or Hart as 
an employee of the District, acted willfully and maliciously in failing to 
protect M.M.108  Because the district court determined the conduct did not 
reach the higher “willful and malicious” standard, the District was found to 
be immune.109 
The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s 
analysis on the applied standard because the recreational use immunity 
statutes must be read in conjunction with political subdivision liability.110  
Without harmonization of the statutes, the legislature’s intent may be dis-
regarded and the statutes may be construed to have an “absurd or ludicrous” 
result.111  Thus, the question before the court was whether, in light of 
political subdivision liability and other duties owed to students, the recrea-
tional use immunity statutes should apply, granting no duty to the school 
district, absent a “willful and malicious” standard.112 
B. APPLICATION OF THE RECREATIONAL USE IMMUNITY ANALYSIS 
AND THE ROLES OF STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS 
The appropriate analysis for recreational use immunity applicability 
has been set forth in recent North Dakota Supreme Court cases.113  Despite 
this authority, the court also considered the legislative intent behind the 
recreational use statutes and the statutory duties imposed on schools by the 
 
105. Cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-02. 
106. Id. §§ 53-08-02, -05(1). 
107. M.M., ¶ 11, 783 N.W.2d at 811. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. ¶ 12, 783 N.W.2d at 811-12. 
111. Id. at 812. 
112. See id. ¶¶ 12, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 811, 815. 
113. See Kappenman v. Klipfel, 2009 ND 89, ¶ 20, 765 N.W.2d 716, 723 (quoting Leet v. 
City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d 398) (stating “the proper analysis in deciding 
whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include consideration of the location 
and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs”). 
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legislature to determine whether the true purpose of immunity was served 
by its application in M.M.114 
1. Recreational Use Immunity Analysis 
The court, in M.M., utilized the analysis articulated in Kappenman as 
the “proper analysis” to determine recreational use immunity.115  As M.M. 
presumably had no mixed recreational and non-recreational or commercial 
use, the recent Schmidt decision and its additional considerations were inap-
plicable.116  In other words, consideration must have been given to the loca-
tion of the accident as well as the injured person’s conduct at the time of the 
accident.117  While the location of the accident in Kappenman technically 
fell within the definition of “land” for purposes of the recreational use 
statutes, the court stated the legislature could not have intended a broad 
interpretation of roads to include the section line used for travel and recrea-
tion.118  Thus, the location consideration in Kappenman was determinative 
in holding against applying the immunity.119 
Similarly, the court, in M.M., analyzed the definition and intent to in-
terpret “recreational purpose,” but with lesser weight than in Kappenman.120  
While the term includes education, the statutes in North Dakota “do not 
‘encourage’ schools to open their doors to students for the ‘recreational 
purposes’ of ‘education.’”121  The intent of the statutes, the court noted, was 
“to encourage landowners to open their land for recreational purposes by 
giving them immunity from suit under certain circumstances.”122  Although 
the court acknowledged the traditional recreational use immunity analysis 
by stating the location of the injury was on school grounds and during 
school hours, the court’s main concern was, instead, whether these facts, 
along with the school’s other duties of care, warranted the statutes’ 
application.123 
 
114. See M.M., ¶¶ 14-15, 783 N.W.2d at 812-13. 
115. Id. ¶ 13, 783 N.W.2d at 812. 
116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
117. M.M., ¶ 13, 783 N.W.2d at 812. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. ¶ 14. 
121. Id. at 813 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-01(4) (2009)). 
122. Id. ¶ 14, 783 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 
69, ¶ 10, 781 N.W.2d 200, 204). 
123. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815-16. 
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2. School Duties of Care 
After utilizing the analysis for the recreational use immunity statutes, 
the court focused its attention on several statutes that address the role of 
schools in North Dakota.124  These statutes include, among other things, 
requirements for health, safety, sanitation, testing, curriculum, and atten-
dance.125  The court also noted it previously recognized a special relation-
ship between schools and students, thereby applying particular duty 
standards.126  Generally, the duty owed to students by schools is one of “or-
dinary care.”127  The exercise of ordinary care in keeping the premises and 
facilities safe extends not only to students, but also to minors who may 
foreseeably be injured.128  Despite the standard being “ordinary care,” this 
standard is actually specified as “such care . . . as a parent of ordinary 
prudence would observe” and “greater than [the duty] owed an adult,” due 
to the age and immaturity of a child.129 
In considering the purpose of the recreational use immunity statutes, 
along with the established school duties, the court determined the two con-
cepts clashed.130  To allow immunity would rule out these duties.131  This 
stance—that recreational use immunity statutes were not intended to relieve 
school duties of care—has been mirrored by other jurisdictions as the 
predominant view.132 
C. OTHER STATE DECISIONS 
Other jurisdictions’ rulings influenced the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s reconciliation of the recreational use statutes.133  Because the issue 
in M.M. had never been raised in North Dakota, other state cases involving 
the applicability of recreational use immunity statutes to student injuries on 
school grounds solidified the court’s decision to follow the majority view-
point.134  In particular, the court relied heavily on the similar, but not 
 
124. See id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813; see also N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 15.1. 
125. M.M., ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 15.1-06, -20). 
126. Id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813. 
127. Id.; see also Besette v. Enderlin Sch. Dist. No. 22, 310 N.W.2d 759, 763 (N.D. 1981). 
128. M.M., ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (citing Besette, 310 N.W.2d at 763). 
129. Id. ¶ 15, 783 N.W.2d at 813. 
130. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15. 
133. See id. 
134. Cf. id. ¶ 16, 783 N.W.2d at 813 (“Numerous courts have refused to apply recreational 
use immunity statutes to bar suits against school districts brought by students injured on school 
grounds during the school day.”). 
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identical, fact pattern and analysis in Bauer v. Minidoka School District No. 
331,135 an Idaho Supreme Court decision.136 
In Bauer, a student tripped over a sprinkler and injured himself while 
playing on his school’s football field shortly before classes began for the 
day.137  The trial court found recreational use immunity statutes shielded the 
school district from liability.138  On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court 
disagreed and determined while the student was engaging in a recreational 
activity, he was not the type of recreational user contemplated by the 
recreational use statutes.139  Rather, there was a special relationship 
between the school district and students that would be compromised by 
enabling immunity when a student is legitimately on school grounds.140 
Other state courts from Nebraska, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Rhode 
Island, and Washington have declared similar outcomes from cases involv-
ing school district liability.141  In all the cases cited by the court in M.M., 
the recreational use immunity statutes served the same purpose of creating 
no duty to recreational users who were not charged to be on the property for 
recreational purposes.142  However, using the same process of statutory 
interpretation the North Dakota Supreme Court utilized, the cases held no 
immunity should be granted to the schools.143 
 
135. 778 P.2d 336 (Idaho 1989). 
136. M.M., ¶ 16, 783 N.W.2d at 813. 
137. Bauer, 778 P.2d at 337. 
138. Id.  Just as in North Dakota, the recreational use immunity statutes in Idaho are in place 
“to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge 
for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such 
purposes.” Id. at 337-38. 
139. Id. at 339. 
140. Id. at 338-39. 
141. M.M., ¶ 17, 783 N.W.2d at 814. 
142. See Alter v. City of Newton, 617 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); McIntosh v. 
Omaha Pub. Schs., 544 N.W.2d 502, 508 (Neb. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Bronsen v. 
Dawes Cnty., 722 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Neb. 2006); Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 725 
(R.I. 2006); Home v. North Kitsap Sch. Dist., 965 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); 
Auman v. Sch. Dist. of Stanley-Boyd, 635 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Wis. 2001). 
143. Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661 (although the student’s injury occurred after track practice, she 
was legitimately on the premises as a student; thus, the school owed her a duty of care); McIntosh, 
544 N.W.2d at 508 (a student who was part of an athletic clinic program was not barred from 
bringing suit for his injury because the field was not open to members of the public as contem-
plated by the state’s recreational liability statute); Morales, 895 A.2d at 730-31 (a student athlete 
injured during a soccer game was owed a special duty and was not the type of recreational user 
contemplated by the recreational use immunity statutes); Home, 965 P.2d at 1117 (because the 
football game where the football coach was injured was not open for members of the public as the 
recreational use immunity statutes suggested, North Kitsap was not immune under the recreational 
use statute); Auman, 635 N.W.2d at 768 (a student’s injury during recess was a non-recreational 
activity under the state’s recreational use immunity statutes because the student’s attendance was 
mandatory under state law). But see Lanning v. Anderson, 921 P.2d 813, 820 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1996) (a student injured during track practice was barred from bringing suit against the school 
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IV. IMPACT 
The decision of M.M. will undoubtedly affect future school liability 
with regard to students recreationally on school grounds during school 
hours.144  What was left unexplained by the court, however, was the issue of 
trespass on school grounds.145  Furthermore, judicial narrowing of the appli-
cation of the recreational use immunity statutes may have subverted the 
legislative intent behind the 1995 amendments by increasing future 
liability.146 
A. ISSUE OF TRESPASS UNRESOLVED 
The opinion in M.M. follows an assumption that M.M. was legitimately 
on school grounds in his capacity as a student despite the questionable use 
of the premises, the ambiguous permission provided to the students, and the 
time at which the accident occurred.147  Because the court relied upon this 
assumption in determining the outcome, the issue of trespass was not 
discussed.148  In fact, the court mentioned in dicta, M.M. “snuck into the 
auditorium,” but dismissed the allegation as a possible defense to address 
on remand.149  Some cases from other jurisdictions cited by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court, however, potentially allude to the use of recrea-
tional use immunity statutes in a case of trespass on school grounds.150 
In Alter v. City of Newton,151 one case cited by the court in M.M., the 
Appeals Court of Massachusetts emphasized the student’s presence at the 
school, while slightly past school hours for track practice, was legitimate 
for purposes of her status as a student.152  Because her use of the premises 
was legitimate at the time of her injury, the special relationship between the 
school and student remained to impose a duty of care and no recreational 
 
because the Kansas Tort Claims Act applied to school-sponsored activities as well as playground 
areas). 
144. M.M., ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 816 (stating a school district cannot use recreational use 
immunity statutes to escape liability from certain student injuries). 
145. See id. 
146. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land 
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995). 
147. See M.M., ¶¶ 3-5, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 809, 815-16. 
148. See generally id.  Trespass in North Dakota’s recreational use immunity statutes is only 
mentioned in section 53-08-04, with reference to leased lands to the state or to political 
subdivisions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-04 (2007) (“The provisions of this section apply whether 
the person entering upon the leased land is an invitee, licensee, trespasser, or otherwise.”) 
(emphasis added). 
149. M.M., ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 816. 
150. See Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661; Morales, 895 A.2d at 732. 
151. 617 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
152. Alter, 617 N.E.2d at 661. 
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use immunity.153  While still unclear from the court’s holding, lack of per-
mission for the student to be on the premises may have been grounds for 
relieving the school of its duty of care. 
In a similar case cited by the M.M. court, Morales v. Town of 
Johnston,154 a student was injured while playing an organized, school-
sponsored soccer game, which made the student a permitted user of the 
field at that time.155  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the 
recreational use immunity statutes could not be applied in that situation 
because there was a special duty to the student.156  Yet, the court also men-
tioned, “[I]f [the] plaintiff had come to the . . . soccer field to play a soccer 
game that was not organized or sanctioned by the school district, [the town 
of] Johnston may have been immune under the recreational use statute.”157 
Because these cases were presented with facts absent evidence of tres-
passing, it is unclear how the rulings would have changed if the students 
had trespassed.  Based on North Dakota precedent, however, if an indivi-
dual trespasses, as opposed to legitimately uses school premises during 
school hours, recreational use immunity may apply should the individual 
have a “recreational purpose.”158  In the end, the trespass and recreational 
use immunity statute standard of care would be the same:  no duty except 
for willful and malicious acts.159 
While the issue remains whether an individual, who may be a student, 
engages in recreational activities after school hours on school grounds 
would be able to bring a personal injury suit in light of the recreational use 
immunity statutes, such was not the case from the facts stated in M.M.  
 
153. Id. 
154. 895 A.2d 721 (R.I. 2006). 
155. Morales, 895 A.2d at 731. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 732 n.11. 
158. See, e.g., Cudworth v. Midcontinent Commc’ns, 380 F.3d 375, 380 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(noting regardless of invitee, licensee, or trespassee status, recreational use immunity statutes 
apply to property used for public, recreational use). 
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05 (2007) (providing a recreational use immunity statute 
exception for failure to warn against dangerous conditions); Cudworth, 380 F.3d at 379 n.4 
(“North Dakota has abolished the common law distinction between licensee and invitee and the 
elaborate permutations of each, but still recognizes that lesser duties are owed to trespassers.”); 
see also 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 236 (2010) (“An 
exception to a municipality’s statutory recreational use immunity is that a municipality owes the 
same duty to recreational users of its facilities that a private person owes to trespassers.”).  
Compare Schmidt v. Gateway Cmty. Fellowship, 2010 ND 69, ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d 200, 203 (citing 
O’Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 748-52 (N.D. 1977)) (stating the standard for trespassers 
has been retained in North Dakota that no duty is owed to them, but a landowner must not harm a 
trespasser in a willful and wanton manner), with Prokon v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 754 N.W.2d 
709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 466.03(6)(e)) (noting “[r]ecreational-use 
immunity is subject to the exception that it does not provide immunity ‘for conduct that would 
entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person’”). 
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Therefore, following North Dakota precedent and statutes, the outcome of 
M.M. was congruent with these principles. 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT COMPROMISED 
With the passage of the recreational use immunity statutes, the legisla-
ture has acted toward reducing liability of landowners in certain circum-
stances and has reacted toward extending these statutes when faced with 
judicial pronouncements.  An interesting juxtaposition has resulted over the 
years that pit the legislature’s efforts of expanding recreational use 
immunity against the judiciary’s narrower interpretation of the terms within 
the statutes.160  Fundamentally, by limiting the bounds of recreational use 
immunity, more liability—which was sought to be reduced by amending the 
statutes in 1995—could result from the M.M. decision.161 
Yet, despite the court’s prior admonishment of creating public policy 
by judicially expanding liability in Stokka,162 the court’s decision in M.M. 
was more in line with current, established school duties of care to students 
rather than mere legislative intent.163  If the decision in M.M. is, in fact, 
contrary to the legislature’s intent for recreational use immunity statutes, 
the next course of action for the legislature may be the familiar amendment 
process to change or adapt the statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In M.M., the North Dakota Supreme Court held a school district may 
not seek shelter under the recreational use immunity statutes when a student 
was injured on school grounds during school hours.164  In the forty-five year 
history of the recreational use immunity statutes, the statutes have faced 
judicial scrutiny in relation to political subdivisions,165 have been developed 
through the use of specific analysis,166 and have undergone legislative 
 
160. See, e.g., Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 27, 721 N.W.2d 398, 407 (Crothers, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Legislature has never retreated from [the goal of opening property to the 
public for recreational use] by narrowing the scope of the recreational use immunity statutes.”). 
161. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land 
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995) (“With the loss of sovereign immunity through the recent North 
Dakota Supreme Court decision, we have been carefully considering the exposure of the Board of 
University and School Lands relative to the land that it administers.”). 
162. Stokka v. Cass Cnty. Elec. Coop., 373 N.W.2d 911, 914 (N.D. 1985). 
163. See generally M.M. v. Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2010 ND 102, 783 N.W.2d 806. 
164. Id. ¶ 18, 783 N.W.2d at 815. 
165. See generally Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384 (stating 
original recreational use immunity statutes in North Dakota only encompassed private, and not 
public, lands). 
166. See Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, ¶ 20, 721 N.W.2d 398, 406 (“The proper 
analysis in deciding whether to apply the recreational use immunity statutes must include 
consideration of the location and nature of the injured person’s conduct when the injury occurs.”). 
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amendments.167  Despite this long history, the result in M.M. was driven by 
a harmonization of political subdivision liability with recreational use 
immunity, ultimately leading to the conclusion that a school’s duty to 
students precludes immunity under chapter 53-08 in these circumstances.168  
Rather than hinging on legislative history or the plain meaning of the 
statutes, the M.M. decision holistically considered the specific facts of the 
case, the recreational use immunity statutes’ purpose, and established duties 
of care.  Although the decision may be contrary to legislative intent, it falls 
in line with the prevailing view of other jurisdictions.169 
Vanessa Anderson* 
 
167. See House Hearing, supra note 57 (written testimony of Robert Olheiser, State Land 
Comm’r, dated Feb. 22, 1995); see also Hovland, ¶ 16 n. 5, 563 N.W.2d at 388 (“Since Fastow, 
the legislature has amended the recreational use statute to include all public lands, as well as 
private lands.”). 
168. M.M., ¶¶ 12, 18, 783 N.W.2d at 811-12, 815. 
169. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 783 N.W.2d at 813-15. 
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